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Abstract 
This study examines the construction of national identity in two speeches, held respectively 
by King Abdullah II of Jordan and King Mohammed VI of Morocco, during the height of the 
Arab Spring in 2011. These speeches were a response to public uprisings and contained 
numerous reforms, which may have been instrumental for the continued rule of the Jordanian 
and Moroccan regimes. Using theories on national identity rooted in linguistics and sociology, 
this thesis investigates if and how national identity was emphasised and linguistically 
constructed in these two speeches. Given the political situation in the countries and the entire 
Middle East at the time, the kings should have been eager to unite their people around a 
common goal, an exercise in which a strong national identity might play a crucial part. This 
study is of interest due to the numerous similarities these speeches and speechmakers share, 
including the countries they rule, the outcome of their speeches and personal similarities 
between the kings themselves. Through the analysis of the speeches, it became evident that 
both kings emphasised and linguistically constructed a national identity for their respective 
countries. However, this was done employing different means and arguably to various extents.  
Keywords: National identity, King Abdullah II, King Mohammed VI, Jordan, Morocco, 
political speeches, construction of national identity 
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1. Introduction 
Contrary to what is being debated in some European countries today, the idea of an 
autochthonous national identity is not real. Even though there might be an idea of an 
“identity” which could be considered as “national”, it is likely to be a construction invented to 
serve a purpose. 
Apropos, identity in itself is a fluctuating phenomenon. According to the objectivist 
perception of identity, there are objective factors defining one’s identity, such as a common 
origin, language, culture, religion, psychology and connections to a certain territory. The 
subjectivist perception, on the other hand, tells us that the only thing defining to what 
community or group one belongs is one’s sense of belonging to that specific community.1  
Stuart Hall argued that “the fully unified, completed, secure and coherent identity is a 
fantasy.”2 Instead, it transforms itself to suit new purposes. The same is true for national 
identity, simply because nations do not have natural identities – the identities of nations are 
“incessantly negotiated through discourse.”3 They are taken from history and shaped by 
historical events and memories. Hence, they can be remade in history just as easily.
4
  
According to Denys Cuche, national identity has become a state concern, as the modern states 
of today are much more rigid in their control of identity than traditional societies were. The 
modern nation state engages in mono-identification. This means either only recognising one 
cultural identity as the national identity, which according to Cuche is the case of France, or 
recognising a certain cultural pluralism while still defining what Cuche calls “reference 
identity” as the only true legitimate identity. Cuche states that this is more often the case in 
historically more culturally diverse countries, such as the United States.
5
 
Today, the question of national identity is frequently brought up in Europe as extreme right-
wing parties with xenophobic agendas gain support across the continent with nationalist 
arguments. Often, the question of what is “Swedish,” “French” or “Hungarian” is at the centre 
of the debate, as this “identity” is something that, according to the proponents of these parties, 
needs to be protected from the influence of cultures brought in to the countries by immigrants. 
At the other side of the spectrum, national identity is sometimes questioned or contested in 
newly established states or former colonies (Ukraine and South Sudan being two very recent 
examples), as those countries are often made up of various linguistic or ethnic groups that 
never sought to create a sovereign state together. Even though Hall states that all modern 
nations are “cultural hybrids”,6 many of these nations have a history of linguistic and cultural 
continuity and were, in some sense, shaped from their own initiative. This is true for most 
European nations. It is, as said, not true for many former colonies, as they are in fact nations 
invented by other nations. Therefore, some of these countries’ leaders are consciously 
                                                          
1 Denys Cuche, La Notion de Culture dans les Sciences Sociales 4th edition, Paris, La Découverte, 2010, p 100 
2 Stuart Hall. “The Question of Cultural Identity”. In Modernity: an Introduction to Modern Societies, edited by Stuart Hall 
et al., Malden, Mass., Blackwell Publishers 1996 , p 598 
3 Michael Lane Bruner, Strategies of Remembrance: The Rhetorical Dimensions of National Identity Construction,  Columbia S.C., 
University of South Carolina Press, 2002, p 1 
4 Bhikhu Paresh, Discourses on National Identity, Political Studies (1994), XLII, p 504. Cf. also Yasir Suleiman, The 
Arabic Language and National Identity, Washington D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2003, p 7 
5 Cuche 2010, p 106-107 
6 Hall 1996, p 617 
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working on creating and promoting a certain national identity in order to unify their nations.  
This thesis will look at two speeches held by leaders of two Arab countries in a time of 
regional political turmoil, and aims to examine whether or not national identity was being 
emphasised in those times of crisis. This will be done using theories rooted in linguistics and 
sociology that will be applied in the analysis, which hopefully will highlight important aspects 
and tools employed in the construction of national identity. If successful, this study will be 
able to point out whether or not the two speakers differ in their attempts of creating a national 
identity for their respective country. 
 
 
2. Purpose and Research Question 
Building on the above, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether or not national 
identity is under construction in my selected material.  
The material comprises two speeches, one by King Abdullah II of Jordan and one by 
Mohammed VI of Morocco. The backgrounds of these two speeches are similar, as they were 
both given in 2011 at the height of the Arab Spring. Due to these circumstances, both regents 
are in their respective speeches introducing reforms in order to meet the challenges of the 
future. Apart from circumstantial similarities, the kings and their countries share many 
characteristics, the most obvious being that they are both monarchies with pro-Western 
foreign policies. Both Abdullah II and Mohammed VI can also claim descent from the 
Prophet Mohammed, lending religious legitimacy to their rule. Furthermore, both Jordan and 
Morocco are former colonies with non-homogenous populations, and do not have a history as 
independent nation states reaching particularly far back into the past. 
Investigating national identity is interesting from both a linguistic and a political perspective. 
As for the latter, one could ask many questions such as what importance the topics brought up 
in these speeches actually had, and if they helped keeping Abdullah II and Mohammed VI in 
power. However, as this is a thesis focusing on the Arabic language, I shall try to investigate 
what they said and how they said it. Hence, I will need to ignore the political promises or 
reforms made and the effects of these. Hopefully, other studies will be able to answer those 
questions. 
What I intend to investigate is the following: 
Are the kings emphasising and linguistically constructing a national identity for their 
respective countries in these speeches? 
If yes, are there any differences in how this is being executed? 
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3. Background 
When Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in December 2010 he set an entire region 
aflame. Inspired by the Tunisian street vendor, millions of people in the Arab World 
displayed their discontent with their regimes, as they demanded human rights, democracy and 
in many cases the departure of their despot rulers. In Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, they 
succeeded. In Syria, the ongoing civil war is a bloody outcome of, among other things, 
president Bashar al-Assad clinging on to power after wide public uprisings.  
The kings of the Middle East have notwithstanding remained in power. Despite protests in 
monarchies such as Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain and Oman, the kings proved to be more 
difficult to oust than the presidents.  
The kings concerned in this thesis, King Abdullah II of Jordan and King Mohammed VI of 
Morocco, both decided to meet some of the demands made by the protestors by presenting 
new reforms while the Arab Spring was still ongoing, and it is the speeches in which those 
reforms were introduced that this thesis will analyse.  
 
3.1. Abdullah II of Jordan 
Abdullah II is the fourth king of Jordan. His great grandfather Abdullah I was instated as king 
of the Emirate of Transjordan by the UK, and subsequently became the first king of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan upon its creation after independence from the British in 1946. 
Abdullah I was born in Mecca, his father was the Sharif of the city and Abdullah I would 
himself become deputy for Mecca in the Ottoman legislature. He is considered as one of the 
chief architects of the Great Arab Revolt, (which his father proclaimed in 1916) during which 
Arab forces revolted against Ottoman power with the aim of creating a pan-Arab state.
7
  
This Great Arab Revolt is important to the Jordanian royal family, since it serves as a source 
from which they draw political legitimacy. Abdullah II and his father Hussein have both used 
this to play the “Arabism card”, which is seen as one of three aspects of what is generally 
highlighted in the monarchy’s attempts to shape a Jordanian national identity. The other two 
are Jordan’s Bedouin culture and the king’s blood ties to the Prophet.8 According to 
Christopher Phillips, Abdullah II has focused on the monarchy as an institution rather than on 
himself in many of his speeches, a clear shift from his father, while at the same time focusing 
more on Jordanian nationalism and making religious references.
9
  
Abdullah II is generally seen as a liberal ally of the West in an important and shaky region of 
the Middle East. In Jordan, he gets legitimacy from the fact that he is a direct descendant of 
Prophet Mohammed. Even though he praises Jordan’s Bedouin culture in his attempts to 
create national unity and identity, he was quoted in a now infamous interview with the 
                                                          
7 William L Cleveland & Martin Bunton, A Modern History of the Middle East, 4th edition, Boulder, Colo., Westview 
Press 2009, p 157-163 
8 Christopher Phillips, Everyday Arab Identity: The Daily Reproduction of the Arab World, Abingdon & New York, 
Routledge 2013, p 41, 47 
9 Phillips 2013, p 63, 68-70 
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Atlantic calling the Bedouin tribe leaders “old dinosaurs”.10 The fact that his family is not 
originally from Jordan is an obvious hurdle for Abdullah in his attempts to create united 
support for him. Furthermore, as the Jordanian regime is regarded as weak, there has been a 
need to broaden the concept of the Jordanian national identity in order to secure the continued 
rule of the regime.
11
 
The speech analysed in this thesis was held by Abdullah II on the 12
th
 of June, 2011 in 
Amman on the anniversary of the Great Arab Revolt, Army Day and Coronation Day. 
 
3.2. Mohammed VI of Morocco 
Mohammed VI’s family is also not originally from the nation he is currently ruling, but the 
Alaouite family has been in Morocco since the 13
th
 century, establishing the still ruling 
Alaouite dynasty in 1631. The Alaouite family claim descent from the Prophet Mohammed 
through the Prophet’s daughter Fatima and her husband Ali, the fourth caliph and the first 
Shia imam.
12
 
Mohammed VI’s grandfather (sultan Mohammed V) carried out the “Revolution of the King 
and the People”, at the start of which he and his family were expelled by the French 
protectorate regime and sent to Madagascar in 1953. From his exile, he militated for 
independence through radio broadcasts. In 1955, the sultan returned to Morocco and 
negotiated his way to independence in 1956, transforming the nation into a constitutional 
monarchy in 1957.
13
 This event is obviously important to the history of Morocco, and 
Mohammed VI mentions it in the speech I shall analyse later in this thesis. 
Mohammed VI has since his ascension to the throne to some extent moved away from the 
autocratic rule of his father, Hassan II, and is seen by the West as one of the region’s more 
liberal regents. Nonetheless, he has closed newspapers, cracked down on protesters in 
Western Sahara and promised reforms along similar lines of those presented in the speech 
analysed in this thesis (without fulfilling them) before.
14
 One outcome of the reforms 
presented in the speech concerned in this thesis was free elections, in which the Islamist Party 
of Justice and Development (PJD) won. They were subsequently rewarded with their leader 
being appointed prime minister.
15
 This could be seen as a step towards inclusion as Moroccan 
legislation has previously been restrictive on the PJD,
16
 showing that the king is willing to 
adapt to political realities and circumstances. 
The speech analysed in this thesis was held by Mohammed VI on the 9
th
 of March, 2011 in 
Rabat in a televised speech to the nation, considered to be a direct response to the protests in 
                                                          
10 http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270/  
11 Phillips 2013, p 48-49 
12 Albert Hourani, De arabiska folkens historia, Furulund, Alhambra förlag 1992, pp 68, 192 
13 C.R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: a History, London, Hurst & Co 2000,  pp 283-296 
14 http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2058141,00.html  
15 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/201111299577214517.html  
16 http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2058141,00.html  
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Morocco at the time.
17
 
 
3.3. Summary 
Both kings share a number of significant qualities. They can both claim descent from the 
Prophet, they are both viewed in positive light by the West and they have both displayed an 
understanding of the need to adapt for the better of their kingdoms and for the sake of their 
own continued rule, while at the same time showing autocratic tendencies. The countries they 
rule are also similar in numerous ways. They are both former colonies, they have 
heterogeneous populations and can show a good record of political stability compared to 
many of their neighbours. 
These are all aspects important to my decision to analyse these two speeches, made at this 
particular time, by these particular kings. Taken together, these aspects will (hopefully) make 
my survey rewarding and interesting. 
 
4. Theory 
4.1. Theoretical base: three theories on national identity 
 
The theories that will work as my theoretical base are the three theories on what constitutes 
national culture and national identity, and how this identity is created and upheld, presented 
by Stuart Hall, Leszek Kolakowski and Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart. I shall try to 
present them briefly in this section. 
Stuart Hall was a Jamaican-born British cultural theorist and sociologist. In his article The 
Question of Cultural Identity,
18
 Hall argues that identities are constructed by national cultures 
and that the meaning of “the nation”, with which people can identify, is produced by and 
contained in stories being told about the nation. These stories connect a nation’s past to its 
present.  
According to Hall, the narrative of a national culture is constructed by a number of elements. 
Among these are the stories, contained in literature and media, which give meaning to 
everyday life in a nation. This narrative of shared experiences “lends significance and 
importance to our humdrum existence, connecting our everyday lives with a national destiny 
that pre-existed us and will outlive us.”19 There is also an emphasis on timelessness and 
tradition, and the invention of tradition in the “narration of the nation”, as Hall calls it. 
Finally, Hall believes there to be an evocation of an original people around whom the nation 
is founded, and foundational myths depicting the (often fictitious) foundation of a nation, 
present in the construction of national identity.
20
 
                                                          
17 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/08/the_reform_of_the_king  
18 Hall 1996, pp 595-634. 
19 Ibid., p 613. 
20 Ibid. pp 613-615. 
9 
 
Critique has been raised against Hall’s notion of a narratively constructed national identity. 
Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart have pointed out that these aspects are almost 
inseparable, and could in fact all be subcategories of the first element, the narrative of national 
culture.
21
 I would argue that, although some of the points share many similarities, they are 
distinguishable even though that might depend on what material is being analysed. Some of 
Hall’s points will be brought up and re-examined later in this chapter. 
The second theory is that of Leszek Kolakowski, a Polish philosopher best known for his 
analyses on Marxist thought. In Über kollektive Identität,
22
 Kolakowski argues that national 
identity is characterised by five elements: it contains the idea of a national spirit (a 
Volksgeist), a historical memory (remembering events of a nation’s past in a manner serving a 
specific agenda), the way a nation anticipates the future, the idea of a “national body” 
(landscapes and physical artefacts) and lastly a nameable beginning to a nation, unspecific but 
widely recognized (such as “the founding fathers”).23 
Neither of these two theories is perfect. To some extent they overlap and in other ways they 
complement one another. 
Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart have presented their own theory on what constitutes the 
discourse on national identity, based on the above and their pilot analyses of national identity 
construction in Austria.
24
 This theory, or rather “thematic areas”, is later employed in their 
investigation on national identity discourse in Austria in The Discursive Construction of 
National Identity. What they present is a synthesis of Hall’s and Kolakowski’s works, as they 
see neither of these theories as sufficient. They do however believe that they overlap and that 
both make some valuable points.
25
 Wodak et al. present their own five aspect scheme, their 
own adapted version of the theories presented by Hall and Kolakowski and the initial findings 
of their study. 
The following is what Wodak et al. stipulate as the five major thematic areas of national 
identity construction:
26
 
1) The linguistic construction of the homo nationalis27 
2) The narration and confabulation of a common political past 
3) The linguistic construction of a common culture 
4) The linguistic construction of a common political present and future 
5) The linguistic construction of a “national body” 
                                                          
21 Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart, The Discursive Construction of National Identity, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press,1999, p 24 
22 Originally presented in in Michalski, Krzysztof (ed.), Identität im Wandel: Castelgandolfo-Gespräche 1995. Instutut für 
die Wissenschaften com Menschen. Stuttgart, pp 47-60. As I have not been able to find this work, I have used the 
version of Kolakowski’s theory presented in Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart, The Discursive Construction of 
National Identity, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, pp 25-26 and it is this presentation of his theories I 
will be referring to. 
23 Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart 1999, pp 25-26 
24 Ibid., p 30 
25 Ibid. pp 24-26 
26 Ibid., p 30 
27 Originally presented as “homo Austriacus”, since their study exclusively concerns Austria. As my study concerns two 
countries, I shall refer to it as “homo nationalis”. 
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As their data concerns Austria and their study differs from mine, I have decided not to simply 
use their theory as I find part of it to be irrelevant to my material. Furthermore I believe that, 
even though Wodak et al. have created their own theory of what national identity discourse is 
comprised of, some of these elements are highly unspecific and difficult to detect. That 
specifically concerns the third and the fifth elements on their list. Therefore, I have decided to 
return to both Hall and Kolakowski in order to create my own synthesis of the three theories 
presented so far, and formulate what, in my opinion, is a more complete theory of what 
constitutes national identity construction. 
 
4.2. Theoretical framework 
 
I will base my search for a construction of national identity in these speeches on the following 
five instruments. 
1) National spirit (Volksgeist) and the construction of a homo nationalis 
2) Historical memory 
3) Foundational myth 
4) Narration and confabulation of a common political past 
5) The linguistic construction of a common political present and future 
I consider these five to be instruments of a national identity construction. As such, they are all 
functioning methods for the construction of national identity and each of them could, 
individually, assist in the creation of such an identity. These five instruments are thus not 
components of a set universal package invaluable to the construction of national identity, 
since there are many ways to create, construct, shape and establish a national identity, as 
shown by the theories presented above. Nonetheless, I have chosen to examine these 
particular instruments since I believe them to be relevant to my primary material. In the 
following passages, I shall try to argue, more specifically, for why I have chosen them and to 
present them more exhaustively. 
I have kept three of the instruments presented by Wodak et al: homo nationalis (here as a 
complement to Kolakowski’s Volksgeist), narration and confabulation of a common political 
past and the linguistic construction of a common political present and future. Instead of 
Wodak et al. “linguistic construction of a common culture” and “national body”, I shall 
examine Kolakowski’s concept of historical memory and Hall’s concept of foundational 
myths. This is because I believe that these two instruments are both more easily detected and 
more relevant to study. The way Wodak et al. describe the concept of a common culture, it 
may contain everything from language and religion to sports and eating habits.
28
 This may 
sound concrete and specific, but these are things that, in my opinion, are cultural phenomena 
in a society. They are “facts”, of sorts, in the sense that they exist and people participate in or 
perform them every day. The concept of a “national body”, which concerns both landscapes 
and physical national artefacts, suffers from the same “problem”, as it concerns physical 
                                                          
28 Ibid., p 31 
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items.
29
 Most importantly, I do not expect to find depictions of sports, eating habits and 
landscapes in the political speeches I am about to analyse. Wodak et al. have included 
interviews with Austrian individuals in their data, and in that context the inclusion of common 
culture and “national body” is reasonable, as these are things that many of us might have 
mentioned should we have been asked about what is specific for our culture or identity. 
However, they are not instruments one can expect to find in a political speech, and that is, as 
said, why I have excluded them from my study. 
As for the construction of national identity, I believe that it is more relevant to look at what is 
actually constructed. Therefore, I have included “historical memory” and “foundational 
myth”, as both are examples of construction and require either a doctored version of truth or 
an inaccurate description of a certain event. Based on the assumption that identity is a 
construct, and from examining the theoretical literature, I consider the five instruments I have 
chosen to be the most adequate for my analysis.  
The first instrument is, as said, constituted by both Kolakowski’s “Volksgeist” and Wodak et 
al. construction of a “homo nationalis”. The Volksgeist (national spirit) is something which 
according to Kolakowski expresses itself in certain cultural forms and certain manners of 
behaviour of a group of people, especially in times of crisis, which is why I would like to try 
it on my selected material. Wodak et al. concept of the construction of homo nationalis 
complements this in a rather efficient way. The Volksgeist is a metaphysical entity, present in 
the minds of people, whereas homo nationalis is something that is actively constructed. 
According to Wodak et al. speechmakers could appeal to emotional attachments to one’s 
Vaterland, a national mentality and conjecture certain national behavioural dispositions.
30
 
This first tool, the combination of these two concepts, is thus aiming at evoking a “national 
spirit, which is assumed to be present in the minds of a nation’s people as well as at actively 
constructing a “national human being”. Hence, a speaker using this tool is attributing 
particular characteristics to a people. 
Jordan and Morocco are two countries with very heterogeneous populations. About half of 
Jordan’s population is Palestinian, and Morocco could be considered an ethnic melting pot.31 
Bearing this in mind makes it, in reality, quite hard to describe the typical Jordanian or 
Moroccan, which is an added reason why the Volksgeist/homo nationalis instrument is of 
interest in this study.   
The second instrument is Kolakowski’s concept of “historical memory”, which is the idea of 
remembering one or several events in a particular way, thus making it suit a certain agenda. It 
may involve excluding facts or placing a disproportionate importance on happenings, 
streamlining it in accordance to that agenda or ideology. Kolakowski stated that “some 
nationalities which have formed just recently invent an ad hoc artificial relation to the past 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p 25, pp 30-31 
31 http://www.refworld.org/docid/49749cfcc.html & 
http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/392604/Morocco/46574/People  
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without the existence of real, verifiable connections”.32 This aspect too, is of significant 
interest in relation to Jordan and Morocco. 
Even though the third instrument, Hall’s concept of “foundational myths”, may share 
similarities with the instrument of historical memory I would argue that they differ in certain 
ways. This third instrument, a foundational myth, evokes a beginning in a nation’s existence 
and does not simply write pseudo-history. A foundational myth locates the origin of a nation, 
but it does so in vague terms, referring to this beginning as if it took place in “mythic” times 
even when the actual birth of a nation is well-documented and well-known. “[Foundational 
myths] provide a narrative in terms of which an alternative history or counter-narrative, which 
pre-dates the ruptures of colonization, can be constructed.”33 A foundational myth is thus an 
event to which someone refers as the beginning of a nation, without this necessarily having to 
be a true recitation of history. New nations are often founded on these myths, making this 
concept interesting in the cases of Jordan and Morocco. 
The fourth instrument, “narration and confabulation of a common political past”, could also 
be considered as one and the same as the second (i.e. historical memory), but here too, I argue 
that there are some fundamental differences. The main difference is that the construction of a 
political past concerns past political successes, defeats and times of prosperity, rather than 
simply creating pseudo-history. If historical memory concerns mentioning certain events, the 
narration of a common political past tells us the story of how a nation together created those 
events. Here, I argue that the importance lies in a nation having shared something, with the 
actual happenings being of secondary significance. Wodak et al. gives the example of how 
Austrian politicians have emphasised how the Austrians were victims of National Socialism.
34
 
Despite this being an unpleasant memory, it is effective as it paints a picture of a shared 
political past. If this notion is present in my material, the kings will try to emphasise shared 
past events, regardless of them being positive or negative. 
The fifth instrument is called the “linguistic construction of a political present and future.” 
Just like the fourth, it is taken from Wodak et al. It concerns citizenship, political 
achievements, current problems, dangers and future aspirations. Here, the speaker will attempt 
to create a common political present and future using linguistic means. According to the study 
carried out by Wodak et al., there are a number of strategies employed in order to create a 
national identity. The strategies used to create and establish a certain national identity are 
called “Constructive Strategies”35, and Wodak et al. present a number of sub-strategies within 
this category. I shall try to present them briefly. The “Assimilation, Inclusion & Continuation 
Strategy” aims to emphasise intra-national sameness and positive political continuity, and a 
speaker performing this strategy will try, among other things, to unite his audience through 
the use of “we”, spatial reference and temporal references indicating continuity, such as 
“since” or “always”. The “Singularisation Strategy” establishes a nation’s identity by 
accentuating its uniqueness, and the “Autonomisation Strategy” focuses its emphasis on the 
                                                          
32 Originally in Kolakowski 1995, p 33. Quote in English taken from Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart 1999, p 25 
33 Hall 1996, p 614 
34 Wodak et al. 1999, p 31 
35 Ibid., p 33 
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nation’s independence and sovereignty. The “Unification & Cohesivation Strategy” 
emphasises shared common features and the will to co-operate and unify, through appeals for 
co-operation and “lexemes with semantic components creating unification”.36 The 
“Dissimilation/Exclusion & Discontinuation Strategy” tries to emphasise inter-national 
differences and difference between present and past, by excluding other groups through the 
use of “they” and “them”. A “Strategy of Avoidance” aims to suppress/background intra-
national differences and inter-national sameness, and the “Vitalisation Strategy” uses 
personifications and anthropomorphisms in order to vitalise features of a nation.
37
 
Being aware of these strategies will undoubtedly facilitate my search for linguistic 
construction of a common political present and future. 
I believe that the five instruments presented above constitute a theory of how the creation of 
national identity is accomplished that is more relevant to my material than the theories 
presented by Hall, Kolakowski and Wodak et al. do separately. 
 
5. Method 
After careful analysis of the speeches, I shall present them one at a time in the analysis section 
of this thesis. Looking at speeches, there are many things of interest depending on with what 
purpose you examine a certain speech. In the presentation of the analysis, I have chosen, as a 
principle, not to include the parts of the speeches where actual political promises are made 
and reforms are presented. It is reasonable to assume that promises and reforms are made in 
every country regardless of the political situation. However, every leader presenting reforms 
does not have to emphasise a certain national identity, making what is said outside of the 
reforms the crucial part of these speeches, for the particular purposes of this study. The 
assumption made above, that the presentation of promises and reforms does not constitute an 
arena for the construction of national identity, proved to be correct, with one single exception. 
This exception will be mentioned, but, otherwise, the portions of the speeches introducing 
reforms will not be treated in my survey. 
In the analysis I shall apply the theoretical framework presented, and examine whether or not 
the instruments outlined above are being used. Succeeding in this will require a bit of 
methodological assistance, i.e. defining what I am looking for in relation to each component 
of the theoretical framework. 
As for Volksgeist and homo nationalis, I shall look for statements evoking a certain national 
mentality or behaviour. This means both examining whether or not the kings appeal to a 
certain spirit present in the minds of Jordanians or Moroccans and also an active construction 
of a national human being, including “national features”. Kolakowski argued that the 
Volksgeist will show itself in moments of crisis, and if the kings perceive the situations which 
they have to tackle in these speeches as crises, they might try to appeal to that spirit. 
When describing the concept of historical memory, Kolakowski stated that some nationalities 
                                                          
36
 Ibid., p 38 
37 Ibid., pp 37-39 
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invent an ad hoc artificial relation to the past without evidence to support it.
38
 I shall thus 
examine whether or not the kings are doctoring or modifying history for national identity 
purposes. 
Foundational myths locate the origin of a nation, and I shall therefore examine if the kings are 
using a certain event as their foundational myth, but also how it is described linguistically as 
these myths are often placed in “mythical” times and vaguely described with the aim of 
making them seem ancient. 
As for the narration and confabulation of a common political past, I shall look for traces of the 
speakers mentioning times of unity in defeats and crises. The main focus here is that the 
speaker, in order to achieve a narration of a common political past, will have to point out that 
the people of a nation have shared political history together, regardless of that history being 
positive or negative for the nation as a whole. I expect to detect this by looking at simple 
linguistic means, such as the usage of “we” and “together” in relation to a historical event or 
period being mentioned. 
When examining whether or not a linguistic construction of a common political present and 
future is being used, I shall examine whether or not the speakers are using linguistic means in 
order to emphasise present or future political unity. Here, the strategies presented under this 
category in “Theory” will be of service. 
As I discussed while presenting my theoretical framework, national identity construction can 
take many shapes. Bearing this in mind, one realises that a speaker may emphasise and/or 
linguistically construct a national identity for his country without necessarily using all of the 
five instruments outlined in the theoretical framework. Should I find evidence of any of the 
instruments being used, I shall argue that the speaker, to some extent, is emphasising and/or 
linguistically constructing a national identity. After having analysed the speeches, I will 
hopefully be able to see if and how the speakers differ in their approach to the issue of 
national identity, and thus be able to answer my second research question. 
The paragraphs will be presented in Arabic, followed by my own translation. The translations 
will focus on extracting the essence of the paragraphs rather than achieving a literal 
translation. If a non-literal, more contextual, translation is used, I shall argue for why I have 
chosen that specific translation. The analysis of each speech will be concluded by a summary 
of my findings and preliminary conclusions. 
After having analysed both speeches, I will compare and discuss the general results of my 
analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Ibid., p 25 
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6. Analysis 
6.1. King Abdullah II 
6.1.1. Example 1 
 ،حلاصلإا عم ةلٌوط ةرٌسم باحصأ نحنو ،دحأ ىلع ًاركح سٌل ندرلأا ًف حلاصلإا ىلع صرحلاف
 ةمدقم ًف ماودلا ىلع ناك يذلا ةنامأ تملست نأ ذنم ،ثٌدحتلاو حلاصلإا ىلإ توعد دقف .انتاٌولوأ
رٌٌغتلاو حلاصلإا ثادحإ لجأ نم ،لئاسولا لكب تلمعو ،ةٌلوؤسملا 
”In Jordan, no one holds monopoly over reforms. We are the champions of a long process of 
reform, which has always been at the top of our priorities. Ever since I assumed my powers, I 
have called for reform and modernization and worked through all means in order to bring 
about reform and change.” 
At a first glance these sentences might not look like they evoke nationalist feelings. 
Nevertheless, this paragraph is predominantly concerned with the narration and confabulation 
of a common political past. Abdullah II is focusing on a shared past, a past of Jordanians 
leading the way to reform. 
From this, Abdullah II builds a bridge to the present. He does this by constructing a common 
political present through the use of what Wodak et al. call the “Assimilation, Inclusion & 
Continuation Strategy”39, which predominantly aims at creating a sense of unity and of 
continuation. The new reforms introduced in this speech are not something that the king made 
up simply because public pressure forced him to, but is rather a process that both he and his 
people have been working on for a long time, as established in his narration of a common 
political past. 
حلاصلإا عم ةلٌوط ةرٌسم باحصأ نحنو (literally: we are the masters/champions of a long 
journey with reforms) is a good example of this strategy, indicating that the reforms presented 
on this day are merely a continuation. After having mentioned that no one holds monopoly 
over reforms (probably referring to himself) right before, he is now employing the 1
st
 person 
plural “we” to evoke a sense of inclusion, and then moving forward to emphasise the sense of 
unity and continuation. This is succeeded by the following clause:  ًف ماودلا ىلع ناك يذلا
انتاٌولوأ ةمدقم (“…that has always been at the top of our priorities”). ماود (ad-dawām) 
originally means “continuance” or “perpetuity”, but together with the preposition ىلع (ʽala) it 
takes the meaning of “at all times” or simply “always”. Abdullah II is thus, once again, 
emphasising that this is merely a continuation of a job already started.  
The use of the 1
st
 person plural, spatial reference, and the emphasis on continuation through 
the use of linguistic means such as “always” or “since”, as exemplified in the king’s speech, 
are according to Wodak et al. and as presented in “Theory” means employed in the 
“Assimilation, Inclusion & Continuation Strategy”.40 
                                                          
39 Ibid., pp 37-38 
40 Ibid. 
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6.1.2. Example 2 
 .ناسنلإا ةماركو حماستلاو ةلادعلاو ةٌرحلا ًف اهتلاسرو ،ىربكلا برعلا ةروث ثرإ موٌلا مهلتسن اننإ
 نوٌندرلأا ىقتلا امك ،هلوح ًقتلن يذلا ةنطاوملا أدبمب اعٌمج انركذت نأ دب لا انٌلع ةزٌزعلا ةبسانملا هذهو
 اوراصو ،مهتلود اوسسأو نطولا ىرث ىلع مهلوصأو مهتبانم رئاس نماناوخإ الله ةمعنب مهلك.  
”Today, we draw inspiration from the legacy of the Great Arab Revolt and its mission of 
liberty, justice, tolerance and human dignity. This event is dear to us, and it reminds us all of 
the principle of citizenship around which we unite, like the Jordanians, irrespective of 
backgrounds and origins, who met here on the earth of the motherland and founded their state 
and with God’s grace became brothers.” 
The instruments that come to mind after reading this paragraph are the concepts of 
foundational myths and historical memory. Abdullah II makes a connection between modern 
day Jordan’s citizenship principles and the values that made Jordanians gather on the nation’s 
land and found the Jordanian state. This is a highly unspecific description of how Jordan was 
founded, and evokes the illusion that Jordan is a country with ancient roots. Abdullah II is 
thus using the foundational myth scheme. Since he is, simultaneously, describing certain 
historical events, the king is also evoking the concept of historical memory. According to 
Abdullah II’s narrative, Jordan was founded by Jordanians of different origins because they 
believed in certain values, and saw the land that is now Jordan as place for those values to 
flourish. In reality, the British gave the king’s great grandfather the Transjordanian territories 
in return for not attacking the French and the English forces during the Great Arab Revolt.
41
 
Abdullah II is thus creating an ad hoc relationship to the past, making this a good example of 
the concept of historical memory. Moreover, the above example can also be classified as a 
narration and confabulation of a common political past. This as the king evidently points out 
the Jordanians’ shared political history by mentioning these events. 
Furthermore, the king linguistically constructs a common political present:  
 
هلوح ًقتلن يذلا ةنطاوملا أدبمب اعٌمج انركذت نأ دب لا انٌلع ةزٌزعلا ةبسانملا هذهو (“This event is 
dear to us, and it reminds us all of the principle of citizenship around which we unite”). 
Here, Abdullah II is connecting the Great Arab Revolt to the principles of citizenship that, 
according to him, unite Jordanians even today. By doing this, he is constructing a common 
political present. Here, he uses the “Unification & Cohesivation Strategy” presented by 
Wodak et al.,
42
 as he emphasises common unifying features of Jordanians. In this example, 
those common features are the principles of the Great Arab Revolt. In this sentence, he is 
using simple but efficient means of realisation while employing this strategy. For example, he 
uses the 1
st
 person plural twice: اعٌمج انركذت  (tudhakkirana jamīʽan)– “reminds us all, 
reminded us all” and هلوح ًقتلن (naltaqī ḥawlahu) – “we gather around, we meet about”, here: 
“we unite”, as Jordanians have united around those principles. Abdullah II is emphasising the 
stipulated fact that Jordanians have united before, and they are united today in their values, 
                                                          
41 Cleveland & Bunton 2009, p 167 
42 Wodak et al. 1999, p 38 
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thus establishing that they can unite and come together once more. 
Abdullah II is also, if not as clearly, using the “Assimilation, Inclusion & Continuation 
Strategy”, as he indicates that the Jordanian principles of citizenship are simply a continuation 
of the principles that the presumed ancient Jordanians united around. According to Wodak et 
al., a common linguistic device of this strategy is spatial reference through the usage of 
toponyms (place names), often in a rather vague manner.
43
 The following is a good example 
of this: 
مهتلود اوسسأو نطولا ىرث ىلع مهلوصأو مهتبانم رئاس نم نوٌندرلأا ىقتلا امك   
“Like the Jordanians, irrespective of backgrounds and origins, who met here on the earth of 
the motherland and founded their state.” 
نطولا (al-waṭan) has the meaning of mother-/fatherland, thus holding a nationalistic meaning. 
In its adjective form ًنطو (waṭanī), it holds a less pretentious meaning of “nation”, or 
“national” or “domestic”. Consequently, Abdullah II manages to vaguely refer to a 
geographic area, where the first Jordanians met, without having to specify the borders of this 
area (which are rather arbitrary and in fact non-existing at the time of the original Jordanians’ 
meeting) while at the same time being absolutely clear about what area he is referring to, as 
نطولا in this context can only mean one country – Jordan. Simultaneously, he is evoking 
nationalistic feelings through the use of نطولا, showing how much can be said in only one 
word. 
 
6.1.3. Example 3 
 ،ناسنلإل ةٌنطولا ةٌوهلا ددحٌ يذلا وه ،نطولا اذهل ءامتنلااب ةعانقلاو روعشلا نأ ىلع قافتلاا نم دب لاو
 ،ةٌنٌدلا تادقتعملا وأ ،لوصلأاو تبانملا ةٌصوصخ نع رظنلا ضغب ،اهتابجاوو ةنطاوملا قوقح ددحٌو
 وأ،كلذ ىلعو .ةٌساٌسلاو ةٌركفلا تاهجوتلا   ،ةدحاو ةرسأ ،ةرهاطلا ضرلأا هذه ىلع اعٌمج نحنف
نطولا اذهل ًطعٌ امب لاإ رخلآا ىلع دحلأ لضف لاو ،تابجاولاو قوقحلا ًف نوواستم نونطاوم 
”We can all agree that the feeling and the conviction of belonging to this nation is the 
determinant of the national identity, defining our civic rights and duties, regardless of 
background, origin, religious conviction or political and ideological orientation. Furthermore, 
we are all here on this pure land, one family, citizens and equals in our rights and duties, and 
no one is favoured over another except in his dedication to this nation.”  
This paragraph is interesting in many ways, but mostly because Abdullah II actually mentions 
“national identity”.  To some extent, the king defines what national identity in Jordan is. He is 
acceding to a subjectivist interpretation of the concept of identity,
44
 as he is stating that it is 
the feeling of belonging to Jordan that is determinant for one’s Jordanian identity. Abdullah II 
also mentions the existence of various ethnic and religious groups in his country, emphasising 
that despite all the differences between the people in Jordan they are Jordanian.  
Here, Abdullah II is constructing a common political present through his use of the 
“Unification & Cohesivation Strategy” and the “Assimilation, Inclusion & Continuation 
                                                          
43 Ibid., pp 37-38 
44 Cuche 2010, p 100 
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Strategy”. The first one as he is virtually draining his arsenal of linguistic means aimed at 
creating unity: the use of the 1
st
 person plural (اعٌمج نحنف – fanaḥnu jamīʽan - “we are all”), 
highlighting the equality between citizens (نوواستم نونطاوم – muwāṭinūn mutasāwūn - 
“equal citizens”) and calling the nation’s people “one family” (ةدحاو ةرسأ – ʼusra wāḥida). 
The king is also appealing to the sense of commitment in people by stating that “no one is 
favoured over another except in his dedication to his country”. It should be noted that 
Abdullah II throughout the speech mostly uses the 1
st
 person singular, differentiating between 
him on the one hand and him and the people on the other. Hence, when he does use the 1
st
 
person plural it is reasonable to assume this is done with the intention of unifying his people. 
Abdullah II’s use of this strategy almost intertwines with his use of the “Assimilation, 
Inclusion & Continuation Strategy”, with focus being primarily on inclusion. This is also 
done through the use of the 1
st
 person plural (most notably with اعٌمج نحنف = we are all), and 
the use of “we are all here on this pure land”. The latter is an example of a “we are all in the 
same boat”-argument, which is common within this strategy.  
As this paragraph succeeds the one analysed in “Example 2”, where the king focuses heavily 
on the past, it is natural that he would want to connect this to present-day Jordan and 
emphasise unity within the nation in this paragraph.  
 
6.1.4. Example 4 
 ىلإ اهتمجرتو ،اهٌلع ءانبلاو ةردابملا هذه دامتعا ىلإ ةٌعمتجملاو ةٌساٌسلا ىوقلا عٌمج وعدأ ًننإ
 قٌلٌ يذلا ندرلأا ،لبقتسملا ندرلأ انتٌؤر قٌقحتل لوؤسملا ًنطولا لمعلا هاجت ةٌروف تاوطخ
تاٌدحتلا ةهجاوم ًف مهمزعو ،نٌٌندرلأا تاحومطب 
”I call on all political and societal forces to support this initiative, to build on it and to 
translate it into immediate steps of a responsible and national effort toward the realisation of 
our vision for Jordan’s future - a Jordan that suits the aspirations of Jordanians and their 
willpower to face challenges.” 
A novelty in this paragraph is that this is the first and only time Abdullah II touches upon the 
idea of a Volksgeist or homo nationalis. He does this when talking about “the aspirations of 
Jordanians and their willpower to face challenges”. مزع (ʽazm), here translated as willpower, 
holds an even stronger significance, meaning (among other things) “determination”, “firm 
will” or “resolution”. It is the masdar of the verb مزع (ʽazama) – meaning “to decide” or “to 
resolve” which is used. The king is thus indicating that it is in Jordanian nature to be 
determined to face challenges, or to be determined while facing challenges.  
Stating that this is a clear example of Volksgeist or homo nationalis would be to stretch the 
span of those concepts. Indeed, national behavioural dispositions or a national mentality are 
both characteristics of the Volksgeist/homo nationalis component, but in order for it to be a 
clear example of the use of this instrument there would need to be further emphasis on what 
makes a person typically Jordanian. Here, Abdullah II is merely stating that Jordanians are 
determined when facing challenges and he is not implying that this is specifically Jordanian. 
According to Wodak et al. and their concept of homo nationalis, someone’s national mentality 
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is often connected to that person’s place of birth. Even though Abdullah II is indicating that 
the Jordanians’ “willpower to face challenges” is ontologically Jordanian, he is not clearly 
stating that this quality is particular for his country. On the other hand, one could argue that 
the “challenges” Abdullah II is talking about is a crisis during which this determination 
present in Jordanian nature manifests itself, but it is, as already indicated, not clear that this is 
the case Abdullah II is making. Therefore, Kolakowski’s concept is not completely applicable 
in this sentence. Neither does Abdullah II construct a homo nationalis, even though he 
approaches the concept by ascribing a certain quality to Jordanians. Despite having stated, in 
the previous example, that Jordan is a country of people of different origins who became 
Jordanians, the king does not “create” a typical Jordanian person in this paragraph. 
As for the remainder of this paragraph, the following is worth further examination. 
ةردابملا هذه دامتعا ىلإ ةٌعمتجملاو ةٌساٌسلا ىوقلا عٌمج وعدأ (”I call on all political and societal 
forces to support this initiative”) 
Here, Abdullah II is once again constructing a common political present. The king is 
attempting to unify his people, as he is emphasising his desire for different political and 
societal forces to come together, to pull together and to co-operate by supporting the king’s 
reforms. According to Wodak et al., this is a common linguistic means and a crucial part of 
the “Unification and Cohesivation Strategy”. 
 
6.1.5. Summary: 
Abdullah II is using all of the instruments outlined in the theoretical framework except the 
first (Volksgeist and homo nationalis), which he is merely approaching. Of the ones used, 
there are evident examples. 
In the first example, Abdullah II is both narrating a common political past and constructing a 
common political present. In the second, he is referring to a historical memory, evoking the 
imagery of a foundational myth, confabulating a common political past and constructing a 
common political present, continuing with the latter in the third example. In the fourth 
example, he touches upon the concept of a national human being or a national spirit, but does 
not, as stated, quite meet all the criteria. Moreover, he is continuing his construction of a 
common political present. The strategies he is using while constructing a common political 
present are the “Assimilation, Inclusion & Continuation Strategy” and the “Unification & 
Cohesivation Strategy”. What is interesting is that even when creating a common political 
present, Abdullah II is rooted in history. While using the “Assimilation, Inclusion & 
Continuation Strategy”, he is focusing heavily on continuation, which he sets himself up for 
through his historical references. 
In addition to using most of the instruments outlined in the theoretical framework, Abdullah II 
is using a nationalistic vocabulary in general. In all examples except for example 3, he is 
using the word Jordan. In this third example, however, he uses the word نطولا (al-
waṭan),”motherland”, twice. The word ”Jordanian” is used in example 2 and 4.  
The 1
st
 person plural (both the word “we” itself and the verb conjugation) is employed in all 
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examples except the fourth. Abdullah II refers to himself as “I” during the entire speech, 
which clearly indicates that his use of “we” is aimed at creating unity and a sense of inclusion. 
 
6.2. King Mohammed VI 
6.2.1. Example 1 
 باطخ ًف هنع انلعأ امل لاٌعفتو02  تشغ0202 عٌمجلا وعدن ،بعشلاو كلملا ةروث ىركذ ةبسانمب ،
ءاج ام جاضنإ ةلصاوم ًف طارخنلال ءانبو عساو ًنطو شاقن قاطن ًف ،ماعلا روصتلا اذه ًف.  
”Consistent with what I announced in my address on 20 August 2010, commemorating the 
Revolution of the King and the People, I call on everyone to engage in the continuing 
maturity of what has been outlined in the general plan through a national and constructive 
wide-ranging debate.” 
“The Revolution of the King and the People” is an event in Moroccan history that could be 
mentioned as an attempt to create national identity and unity. However, it is the event that led 
to the creation of independent Morocco, which disqualifies it from functioning as a 
foundational myth. Here, it simply serves the role of a nationalistic name drop, and 
Mohammed VI is not using it as a narrative for the beginning of his nation. Rather, this 
paragraph is predominantly concerned with the linguistic construction of a common political 
present. The king is employing the “Unification & Cohesivation Strategy”, evident in how he 
is “inviting/calling on everyone” (عٌمجلا وعدن - nadʽū al-jamīʽ) to follow the plan that has been 
outlined for Morocco’s future. Wodak et al. specify the appeals for co-operation as a 
characteristic trait of this strategy, since co-operation is crucial for the creation of unity and 
solidarity in a nation and gives a sense of the people working together towards a specific aim.  
 
6.2.2. Example 2 
 ةسرامم ةٌرحل ةنماضلا ،ةلودلل نٌدك ملاسلإا ًهو ،ًنطو عامجإ طحم ًه ًتلا ،انتباوث ةٌسدق ًف انلو
 ،ًطارقمٌدلا راٌخلاو ،ةٌبارتلاو ةٌنطولا ةدحولاو ،ًكلملا ماظنلاو ،نٌنمؤملا ةرامإو ،ةٌنٌدلا رئاعشلا
.بعشلاو شرعلا نٌب ادٌدج اقاثٌم لكشٌ ،ًخٌرات قفاوتل ،نٌتملا ساسلأاو ،يوقلا نامضلا 
“The sanctity of our values, which are a point of national consensus – Islam as the state 
religion, the guarantee of freedom of worship, the Commandership of the Faithful
45
, the 
monarchial system, national unity and territorial integrity and commitment to democracy – 
provides a strong guarantee and a solid foundation for a historical agreement and the shaping 
of a new treaty between the throne and the people.” 
What is most interesting with this paragraph is that Mohammed VI defines what the 
Moroccan values are, and that they (or rather, their sanctity) will provide a strong base for the 
reforms he intends to implement. As he is emphasising unifying common features within 
                                                          
45 Translated from نٌنمؤملا ةرامإ  (Imārat al-Mu’minīn). نٌنمؤم is the plural of نمؤم, meaning “believer”, an active 
participle from the root نمأ (to have faith in). ةرامإ is a masdar stemming from the root رمأ, meaning “to command”. 
Here, it is translated as “commandership”, but could also mean “emirate” as in “the United Arab Emirate”.  
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Moroccan society, he is thus constructing a common political present through the use of 
“Unification & Cohesivation Strategy”, even though these unifying factors are handpicked by 
the king. It is rather amusing that the king, while he is encouraging the people to unite in 
support of him rather than against him, is implying that “national unity” (ةٌنطولا ةدحولا – al-
waḥda al-waṭanīya) is one of the aspects that actually bring national unity to Moroccan 
society. ةدحولا is however a word of several senses, meaning everything from “unity” as in 
“national unity” to “integrity” and “unit” as in “military unit”. In this paragraph, it is used as 
both “unity” and “integrity”: ةٌبارتلاو ةٌنطولا ةدحولا – al-waḥda al-waṭanīya wa at-turābīya 
=”national unity and territorial integrity”, with ةدحولا being given two different senses by the 
two different adjectives (ةٌنطولا – national, and ةٌبارتلا - territorial) paired with it. The focus 
on unifying factors indicates that the king is linguistically constructing a common political 
present.  
 
6.2.3. Example 3 
لاوأ :  سٌركتلا اهبلص ًفو ،اهدفاور عونتب ةٌنغلا ،ةدحوملا ةٌبرغملا ةٌوهلل يددعتلا عباطلل يروتسدلا
ةبراغملا عٌمجل دٌصرك ،ةٌغٌزاملأا46  
”First: a constitutional enshrinement47 of the varied character of the unified Moroccan 
identity, rich in its diversity and variety, with the Amazigh component as a core element 
residing within all Moroccans.” 
By, to some extent, defining Moroccan identity by ascribing to the Moroccans an element 
residing within all of them, Mohammed VI is approaching the concept of a Volksgeist or a 
homo nationalis. This is not a very clear example of either a Volksgeist or a homo nationalis, 
even though the king states that this is an element common to all Moroccans. The king does 
not develop this concept further, and the fact that this is actually one of the reforms 
announced suggests that this is not part of a construction of a national human being. The 
Amazigh (Berber) element is highly present in Moroccan society, as most Moroccans are of 
Arab-Berber descent. It could be considered as specifically Moroccan, but it is neither a 
national mentality nor a behavioural disposition connected to one’s motherland. Rather, it is a 
genetic fact and therefore I argue this is not part of either a Volksgeist or a homo nationalis 
construction. Furthermore, the king is mentioning “the unified Moroccan identity”. In doing 
so, he is emphasising a unifying common feature, hence using the “Unification and 
Cohesivation Strategy.” 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 Taken from Mohammed VI’s list of reforms presented in his speech, hence the “first”. 
47 This is the translation of the word سٌركتلا (at-takrīs) which is the masdar of the verb سرك (karrasa – stemform II), 
which means “to devote” and “to consecrate”, giving سٌركتلا the meaning of “devotion” or “consecration”. Here, I 
have chosen the more contextual translation “enshrinement”. The king wants to protect the “varied character of the 
unified Moroccan identity”, so he is devoting a certain part of the constitution to this aim. However, since 
“enshrinement” means both “to cherish” (“protect”) and “to enclose as if in a shrine” (in this case, in the 
constitution), I consider “enshrinement” to be a more contextually accurate translation in this particular case. 
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6.2.4. Example 4 
 ةدارإو ،مادقإو ةقثب ،رٌبكلا يروتسدلا شرولا اذه حاجنلإ ،ةٌعامجلا ةئبعتلا ىلإ وعدن ،قاٌسلا اذه ًفو
مازتلاو .رابتعا لك قوف نطولل اٌلعلا حلاصملا لعجو ; 
”In this context, I call on everyone to mobilise to ensure the success of this grand 
constitutional undertaking with certitude and resolution and with will and commitment, and to 
place the nation’s best interests above all other considerations.” 
The king wants unanimous support for this reform initiative, and wants everyone to put the 
nation’s best interests first in order for this to succeed. He does this by calling for everyone to 
mobilise behind his initiative, motivating people to oblige by evoking the nationalist notion of 
placing one’s country ahead of one’s personal interests ( لك قوف نطولل اٌلعلا حلاصملا لعجو
رابتعا ).48 As has been mentioned earlier, calling for mobilisation and co-operation is a 
characteristic of the “Unification & Cohesivation Strategy” presented by Wodak et al. 
Furthermore, Mohammed VI is setting a common and unifying future goal for his country by 
referring to his reform initiative, thus also in this way creating both a common political 
present in which Moroccans need to work together and a common political future in which 
Moroccans might be able to enjoy the harvest of their support for the king’s reforms.  
 
6.2.5. Example 5 
 هبابشو ،ةداجلا هتاباقنو هبازحأو ،هتاهجو هتائف لكب ،ًفولا انبعش هب ىلحتٌ امب انزازتعا نع برعن امك
 حور نم ،حومطلاةٌلاع ةٌنطو  ةٌرٌصملا اٌاضقلا ،عسوملا ًنطولا شاقنلا لمشٌ نأ ىلإ نٌعلطتم ;
.نٌنطاوملاو نطولل 
“I would like to express my pride of the sincere patriotism shown by my loyal people all 
across the country, by political parties and trade unions and the ambitious youth. I hope the 
broad national debate will include issues of crucial importance for the nation and the 
citizens.” 
It is important to note, here, that the king throughout his speech is using the 1
st
 person plural 
to refer to himself, which is apparent in this paragraph. When the king says انبعش, using the 
noun بعش (shaʽab =”people”) together with ان (nā = the possessive pronoun for 1st person), 
he is not saying “our people”, but “my people”, using the majestic plural. 
In this passage, the king paints a picture of Morocco as a country filled with patriotism in 
every corner where every fraction of society contributes to the patriotic cause: 
 هتاباقنو هبازحأو ،هتاهجو هتائف لكب ،ًفولا انبعش هب ىلحتٌ امب ةٌنطو حور نم ،حومطلا هبابشو ،ةداجلا
ةٌلاع- “…the sincere patriotism shown by my loyal people all across the country, by political 
parties and trade unions and the ambitious youth.”  
One might wonder how the king defines patriotism, given that the king is announcing his 
                                                          
48 http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405644/nationalism  
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reform initiative as a response to widespread protests in his country – in itself patriotism of 
sorts, but certainly not the kind that pleases the king. Nonetheless, he is creating a scenario in 
which the Moroccans are all patriotically fighting for the same cause, thus presenting a 
common political present, but without using any of the strategies presented by Wodak et al. 
 
6.2.6. Summary: 
Mohammed VI is, in the examples above, almost exclusively working on the construction of a 
common political present. This effort can be found in all examples, and the king is not 
focusing on the past at all. He mentions one historical event, the “Revolution of the King and 
the People”, but, as previously noted, this is not in order to invent a myth around the creation 
of Morocco. The creation of the sovereign state of Morocco was the result of an independence 
struggle, and this may be a reason why the king does not find it necessary to mystify the birth 
of his nation.  
In constructing a common political present, the king is mainly using the “Assimilation, 
Inclusion & Continuation Strategy” and the “Unification & Cohesivation Strategy”. Within 
these strategies, the king focuses predominantly on co-operation and unity. When Mohammed 
VI uses the 1
st
 person plural it is not a clear inclusion marker since he is constantly referring 
to himself in the 1
st
 person plural. When translating these examples, defining whether the king 
is talking about himself or a “we” is a matter of contextual interpretation.  
Furthermore, the word Morocco is not mentioned in any of the examples presented here, even 
though the adjective “Moroccan” is found twice in example 3. The word نطولا (al-waṭan), 
“motherland” is found both as a noun and in its adjectival form in all examples except the 
third.  
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7. Discussion 
Both kings are, as showed in the examples presented, emphasising and linguistically 
constructing a national identity for their respective countries. However, there are 
distinguishable differences in how the kings are approaching the concept of national identity 
construction. Abdullah II is focusing on connecting what he is doing today to a greater cause, 
a cause for which Jordan and Jordanians have fought for decades. There is emphasis on 
foundational myths and historic events, and tying those to the present and thus evoking a 
sense of continuation in the fight for “Jordanian values”. Mohammed VI is exclusively 
focusing on the present, trying to include and unify through various linguistic means. The 
kings use the same strategies in their construction of a common political present. 
Nevertheless, there are differences in their respective emphasis within these. For example, 
when Abdullah II uses the “Assimilation, Inclusion & Continuation Strategy”, he is focusing 
more on continuation than Mohammed VI is, which is also proven by the fact that Abdullah II 
actually refers to a past from which something can continue. Since Mohammed VI does not 
really refer to the past, there is nothing to build upon as far as continuation strategies are 
concerned. As mentioned earlier, Morocco has a clearer common history of fighting for 
independence than Jordan, which may be a reason why Mohammed VI does not find it 
necessary to mention the past or to confabulate a past suitable for his agenda.  
The kings are merely approaching the concept of Volksgeist/homo nationalis, and are not 
creating either a “typical Jordanian” or a “typical Moroccan”. Mohammed VI is however 
coming closer to a description of reality when approaching this concept, since he is 
mentioning the Amazigh element residing within all Moroccans, whereas Abdullah II 
arbitrarily attributes a certain quality to Jordanians. However, the concept of Volksgeist/homo 
nationalis is not necessarily entrenched in reality, so the fact that Mohammed VI is speaking 
of something which is true does not make his approach to the concept more potent than 
Abdullah II’s. 
Both kings are also, to some extent, defining what either the national identity or the national 
values of their respective countries are. In that regard there is, however, one crucial 
difference. When Mohammed VI is talking about the national values of Morocco (“a point of 
national consensus”), he is vaguely establishing these as objective components of national 
identity. Abdullah II, on the other hand, assumes a far more subjectivistic approach, as the 
feeling of belonging to Jordan is what defines the Jordanian national identity. 
The kings have different ways of expressing themselves. Abdullah II is more eager to use the 
1
st
 person plural and the name of his country than Mohammed VI is, and the latter’s frequent 
use of the 1
st
 person plural (both in its original sense and of the majestic plural) does not 
create as clear of a shift between the “I” and the “we” as Abdullah II does.  
Despite their differences, both speakers do emphasise and construct a national identity for 
their respective country. One can, however, argue that they do this to various extents. 
Abdullah II is heavily rooted in the past, and he is succeeding in connecting this past to the 
present day and, to a certain degree, also to the future. This shows that Abdullah II is 
emphasising and constructing national identity to a wider extent than Mohammed VI is. As 
the theoretical literature used in this thesis has showed, connecting what is happening today to 
a greater cause is instrumental to the “narrative of the nation”, which according to Hall serves 
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the purpose of “connecting our everyday lives with a national destiny that pre-existed us and 
will outlive us.”49 I argue that Abdullah II’s emphasis on past events and connecting his and 
his people’s contemporary efforts to history is a good example of Hall’s concept, and that this 
connection proves that Abdullah II is emphasising and constructing a national identity for his 
country to a larger extent than Mohammed VI is. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Both kings are emphasising and linguistically constructing a national identity for their 
respective countries in their speeches. However, there are several differences in how this is 
executed. As shown in this survey, Abdullah II is emphasising both the past and the present in 
his construction of national identity, with the latter being constructed on the base of the 
former. He also uses four of the five instruments outlined in the theoretical framework. 
Mohammed VI only uses one; he is exclusively accentuating the present and does not present 
a past to build the Moroccan identity upon. Briefly, the biggest difference between the two is 
that Abdullah II places the Jordanian national identity in a larger context than Mohammed VI 
does for the Moroccan identity. 
One could find many probable answers to why that is, but that is not the purpose of this thesis. 
Future studies may help us understand just why these speeches took the shape they took, and 
just how instrumental the creation of national identity was to the continuance of both kings’ 
rule.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Hall 1996, p 613 
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